In Physics VI.9 Aristotle addresses Zeno's four paradoxes of motion and amongst them the arrow paradox. In his brief remarks on the paradox, Aristotle suggests what he takes to be a solution to the paradox.
§1 An initial interpretation and two puzzles §1.1 Stating the paradox
Aristotle's introduction of the arrow paradox is brief, and rather obscure: 2 Zeno's reasoning, however, is fallacious, when he says that if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always in a now, the flying arrow is therefore motionless.
It is hard to understand what exactly the paradox says, but I shall take the following to be a relatively uncontroversial construal of it: 3
Arrow-0
Let I be an interval of time, in which a flying arrow is in motion.
(1) Everything is at rest when it occupies a space equal to itself. (premise) (2) At every instant t contained in I, the arrow occupies a space equal to itself (implicit premise) (3) At every instant t contained in I, the arrow is at rest at t. (From (1) and (2)) 2 Physics VI.9, 239 b 5-10 (All translations are by Hardie and Gaye, and taken from Barnes (1995) ).
3 For a defence of a similar construal, see Barnes (1975), pp. 276-283 
. (The main difference between
Barnes's construal and mine is that he takes premise (4) to play a role in establishing (3), rather than in motivating the move from (3) to (5). This difference is unimportant for the rest of my argument). At least one way in which my construal is controversial, however, is that I interpret 'nu¤ n' ('now' in the translation used) as 'instant'. For support of this interpretation see Barnes (1975), p. 278 and . Other alternatives include 'present instant' (Lear (1981) ), or 'time atom ' (Valstos (1975) , p.
187).
2 (4) The arrow is always 'at an instant ' (premise) Therefore, (5) The arrow is motionless in I. (From (3) and (4)) Since from the assumption that the arrow is motion in I it follows, according to the paradox, that the arrow is motionless in I we can conclude that the assumption is wrong and the arrow cannot be in motion in I. Now whatever is meant by the obscure phrase 'occupies a space equal to itself ', it seems that the crucial step of the argument as far as Aristotle is concerned is the move from (3) to (5), that is, he is in essence concerned with the following argument: Arrow-1 (6) At every instant t contained in I, the arrow is at rest at t. Therefore:
(7) The arrow is motionless in I. §1.2 Aristotle's solution Now here are the two comments Aristotle makes in response to the paradox: This is false; for time is not composed of indivisible nows any more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles. 4 This is endorsed for example by Barnes (1975 ), p. 282, Owen (1958 ), p. 216, and Lear (1981 , p. 92. 
3
The third is that already given above, to the effect that the flying arrow is at rest, which result follows from the assumption that time is composed of moments: if this assumption is not granted, the conclusion will not follow.
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According to the most plausible interpretation of this text, Aristotle is proposing the following: Zeno's argument, as it stands, is invalid (that is, the conclusion (7) does not follow from the premise (6)). Zeno's argument would have been valid, were we to add the additional premise 'time is composed of instants '. 7 That is, the following argument is valid:
Arrow-2 (8) At every instant t contained in I, the arrow is at rest at t.
(9) Time is composed of instants.
Therefore, Barnes (1975) , p. 282.
10 A similar point is made by Vlastos (1975) , p. 189.
11 Barnes (1975) (Puzzle-2) As we shall see in the following sections, most commentators (including myself) believe that Aristotle rejected premise (8), namely the claim that at every instant t contained in I, the arrow is at rest at t. Given this, it is highly surprising that Aristotle does not (at least not explicitly) attack Zeno's argument on the grounds of its being based on a false premise: Zeno's argument is attacked on the grounds of being invalid, not on the grounds of being unsound.
I thus take it that it is desirable to find an interpretation of Aristotle's solution to
Zeno's arrow paradox that provides an adequate response to puzzle-1 and puzzle-2, and in §4 I will suggest such an interpretation. §2 Being in motion and at rest at an instant Before I turn to discuss the various interpretations of Aristotle's solution to the paradox, there is one important issue that requires further elaboration. In stating puzzle-2 above, I have mentioned that one point of agreement between the interpretations I reject and my own interpretation is that we all maintain that Aristotle rejected premise (8), that is, we all maintain that Aristotle rejected the claim that the arrow is at rest at every instant contained in I. However, as will become apparent, our reasons for attributing this view to Aristotle are importantly different, and rely on a different understanding of Aristotle's position on the general question of whether it is in principle possible for an object to be in motion or at rest at an instant. Let me therefore briefly discuss the issue of Aristotle's position on this general question.
It is a widely accepted orthodoxy that Aristotle held the view that nothing can be in motion or at rest at an instant. 12 This is usually based on the thought that saying 'O is in motion (rest) at an instant t' involves some sort of category mistake, that is, the concepts 'being in motion at x' or 'being at rest at x' are in some sense applicable only to time intervals, not to instants.
13
The fact that this claim is so widely accepted is hardly surprising. Several passages in
Aristotle seem to support it directly, especially the discussion in Physics VI.3
(234 a 24-32), in which Aristotle explicitly says "nothing can be in motion in a now…Nor can anything be at rest".
14 Nevertheless, I think this orthodoxy is wrong. Benjamin Morison has recently argued that this passage from Physics VI.3, namely 'ou¦ qe£ n e¦ n t%¤ nu¤ n kinei¤ tai', should not be translated as saying that nothing can be moving at an instant, but rather as saying that nothing can be moving during an instant. 15 The idea is that there cannot be any instantaneous motions (sometimes called 'jerk motions') -no motion or rest can be produced in an instant, and no object can be in the state of motion or in the state of 12 See for example Barnes (1975) , p. 281, Lear (1981 ), p. 92, Moore (2001 ), p. 42, Pickering (1978 , p.
256, Ross (1936), p. 71 and Vlastos (1975), p. 192 . I am ignoring here the different terminology used by different writers to make this claim, e.g. the use of 'in an instant' rather than 'at an instant'.
13 This claim is sometimes (e.g. by Barnes (1975) ) taken to say that 'O is in motion at t' is simply false, sometimes (e.g. by Vlastos (1975) the changing thing is at rest in the whole time CA..., it is at rest in A also". This is at least one passage in which Aristotle seems perfectly content to explicitly attribute the property of being at rest at an instant to an object.
Another argument against the thesis that Aristotle held nothing can be in motion or at an instant is the following: if this claim were true, then it is hard to see how we can provide an adequate interpretation of Aristotle's solution to Zeno's arrow paradox, and in particular one which addresses puzzle-2: if nothing can be in motion or at rest at an instant, claim (6) would be obviously false, and Aristotle could have easily dismissed the paradox on the grounds of being unsound. 16 The latter claim with respect to rest is problematic when we consider the extreme positions of a swinging pendulum or a bouncing ball (see Morison (MS), n. 10 and Bostock (1973) Aristotle discusses here the question of whether a geometrical point can move in isolation. He argues that it is impossible for a point to move in isolation, but only "in so far as the body or the magnitude to which it belongs is in motion, just as that which is in a boat may be in motion in virtue of the motion of a whole".
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An equivalent principle, I think, should apply to motion at an instant. There cannot be independent motion at an instant. However, it can still be true that at an instant a body is in motion, in so far as that instant belongs to an interval of time in which there is motion. The upshot is that it is not a category mistake to say that a body is in motion or at rest at an instant. What is true is that if a body is in motion (rest) at an instant, this fact is derivative on its being in motion (rest) at a stretch of time containing this instant.
It is important to understand that this is not a semantic claim.
I have not said that
Aristotle defines a new sense of the phrase 'being in motion'. He has not stipulated that 'O is in motion at t' means the same as 'O is in motion at I, and t is contained in I'. Rather, this is a metaphysical claim. If anything is in motion at an instant, this must be ontologically dependent on the fact that it is motion in a stretch I that contains t. 22 Vlastos (1975) . This is a reconstruction of Vlastos's claims using my own terminology.
The reason, according to Vlastos, is that Aristotle thinks that there cannot be motion and rest at an instant (presumably, the claim that time is not composed of instants is supposed to remind us of this point). It follows that while (11) is true (because the arrow cannot be in motion at t), 23 (12) is not true. So (12) (which is identical with premise (6) in Arrow-1) should not be accepted, and therefore Zeno's argument is unsound. In other words, Vlastos assumes that the only reason to suppose (12) is true in the first place is because it is the conclusion of an implicit 'pre-argument' -the one from (11) to (12). But because the pre-argument is invalid, we should not take (12) to be true.
In a sense Vlastos's interpretation offers a response to both puzzle-1 and puzzle-2, but only at the price of making his interpretation implausible. The response to puzzle-1 is that Arrow-1 is already valid, and hence Arrow-2 is trivially valid (without any special appeal to the premise concerning composition). And the response to puzzle-2 is that according to Vlastos, Aristotle is attacking the soundness of the argument, although he does so only implicitly, via his attack on the validity of the pre-argument that is supposed to supply the grounds for accepting premise (6).
But this response to puzzle-1 is unsatisfying because Vlastos offers no explanation for why we should take Arrow-1 to be valid. And the response to puzzle-2 is unsatisfying because it does not bear much resemblance to Aristotle's discussion of the paradox as it appears in the text. Aristotle presents the paradox as resting on the claim that the 23 Note, however, that this is already at tension with Vlastos's claim that "To say that the arrow is moving in any instant would be (strictly speaking) senseless" (p. 192). One would expect that negating a senseless sentence would result in a senseless sentence, rather than in a true one.
arrow is at rest (rather than that it is not in motion) at every instant. One would expect that if the main point of Aristotle's solution lies in rejecting the move from (11) Lear claims that Aristotle has two separate solutions to the paradox. Firstly, Aristotle thinks that Arrow-1 is invalid, because the move from (6) to (7) requires the additional premise (9). In addition, he claims, Aristotle thinks that Arrow-1 is unsound, because he thinks that nothing can be in motion or at rest at an instant, and hence premise (6) is false.
Lear's interpretation clearly avoids some of my objection to Vlastos's interpretation:
Lear shares my view that the argument the validity of which is questioned in Aristotle's passage is Arrow-1 (rather than the pre-argument suggested by Vlastos).
And his interpretation clearly avoids my last objection to Vlastos, because on his view
Arrow-3 will be invalid, just as Arrow-1 is.
27 Lear (1981) .
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However, Lear provides us with no answers to the two puzzles I raised. He provides no adequate explanation for why Arrow-2 is valid. Nor does he explain why Aristotle does not attack the falsity of Zeno's premise explicitly. His interpretation seems to make the fallacious move from:
(i) Aristotle holds the view that nothing can be in motion or at rest at an instant.
And
(ii) The claim that nothing can be in motion or at rest at an instant could in principle be used to solve Zeno's paradox, since it entails that Zeno's argument is unsound.
To:
(iii) Aristotle actually uses the claim the nothing can be in motion or at rest at an instant to solve the paradox.
Even if (i) and (ii) were true, (iii) is not -or at least we have no textual evidence that supports it. §4. An alternative interpretation I now present my alternative interpretation. Aristotle is, I suggest, envisaging two opposing metaphysical views. According to one (in which time is composed of instants), time instants are ontologically and explanatorily prior to time intervals.
According to the other (that endorsed by Aristotle), it is the intervals that are metaphysically prior to the instants.
Zeno, Aristotle is claiming, is implicitly assuming the former picture. He has told us some story about why the arrow is at rest at every instant -let us not argue with this 14 story for the time being. But in order to conclude from this that the arrow is motionless in I, we must assume that the properties of the instants are relevant for deriving the properties of the interval, and this claim only holds in the metaphysical picture that Zeno is implicitly assuming, and Aristotle rejects.
How does this interpretation help solve my two puzzles?
Recall, that puzzle-1 asked why Arrow-2 was valid, which under my current suggestion amounts to asking why, if we were to adopt Zeno's metaphysical picture, premise (7) would follow from premise (6). Initially, it is not obvious why recasting the question in these terms helps solve puzzle-1: even if we accept that instants are ontologically prior to intervals, there is no reason to think that any property of the instants will be a property of the interval. At best, we can assume that all properties of the interval supervene on properties of the instants. The problem can be addressed if we distinguish between the following two claims:
Claim-1:
If O is composed of Fs , then for every property P, if each of the Fs has P then O has P.
Claim-2:
If O is composed of Fs, then for some privileged property P, if each of the Fs has P then O has P.
Claim-1 is a fallacy. Claim-2 is not, provided that we have some reason to think that P is indeed privileged in the relevant way. For example, I think that the fact that each of my atoms are in a certain location (say the library), does entail that I am currently in that location.
Aristotle, I am suggesting, thinks that being in motion is exactly one of those privileged properties. As he sees it, the most plausible way to adopt the view that motion and rest at an interval can be explained via motion and rest at an instant is to accept that being at motion (rest) at every instant entails being at motion (rest) in the corresponding interval. Versions of the view according to which motion and rest at an interval supervene on motion and rest at instants in other, more complicated ways, are simply taken to be metaphysically implausible.
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How about puzzle-2? In §2, I have claimed that Aristotle thinks that if O is in motion at an interval of time, then it is in motion at each instant contained in that interval.
Since Aristotle obviously believes that the arrow is in motion at I, then he must believe that it is in motion at every instant of I, and therefore that it is not at rest at any (and a fortiori not at every) such instant. So according to my view Aristotle thinks that Zeno's premise (6) But now comes the objection: doesn't it turn out that according to Aristotle's view Arrow-1 is valid after all? If the arrow is at rest at every instant, this must be because it is at rest for the whole interval, so it is at rest at I, that is, Zeno's conclusion follows from premise (6) after all.
This objection is quite ingenious, but it does not work. First, we should note that the above argument does not show that Arrow-1, as it stands, is valid. At best it shows that the following argument is valid:
Arrow-4:
(15) At every instant t contained in I, the arrow is at rest at t.
(16) The properties of instants are derived from the properties of intervals (that is, the correct metaphysical view is the one that I have attributed to Aristotle).
Therefore,
The arrow is motionless at I.
The point is that Arrow-1, as it stands, is invalid unless we explictly add either the premise that Zeno's metaphysical picture is correct (that is, that time is composed of instants), or the premise that Aristotle's metaphysical picture is correct (that is, that time is not composed of instants, and moreover that the properties of instants derive from the properties of intervals). But these are not the only two options: one could think that there was simply no relation between the properties of instants and the properties of the corresponding intervals and therefore that neither picture is correct, in which case (17) will not follow from (15). Thus without adding any further premises Arow-1 is indeed invalid.
Second, and importantly, Arrow-4 (which Aristotle would presumably take to be valid) is not a paradox. For if we accept the metaphysical picture suggested by (16), the only way Zeno could defend premise (15) is by assuming that the arrow is at rest at I. But now it would be Zeno who is begging the question! All that the validity of Arrow-4 shows is that if the arrow is at rest at I (which is the only case that would make (15) true), then the arrow is at rest at I. Hardly a paradox.
To sum up: Aristotle is suggesting that we consider two competing metaphysical pictures. Zeno's argument is initially plausible, because it implicitly assumes a picture where telling us some story about the arrow's independent state at an instant (that is, its 'occupying an equal space') should entail its state at the interval I. In the alternative metaphysical view, no such independent property of the arrow at an instant can tell us anything about its state at I. Furthermore, since the arrow is in fact moving at I, Zeno was wrong to think that the arrow was at rest at every instant. As long as we are willing to accept Aristotle's alternative picture, the paradox is refuted. This result is achieved without directly engaging with the elusive claim that if at an instant the arrow is 'occupying an equal space' then it must be at rest at that instant.
31 31 Thanks to audiences at Cambridge and at Oxford, as well as to Markus Kohl, Gerald Massey, Ben
Morison, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on this paper.
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